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Abstract
In this paper indexes are proposed in order to capture the degree to which a pen-
sion scheme (i) prevents from poverty among the elderly, (ii) enables living-standard
smoothing after retirement, (iii) induces both intra- and inter-generational solidar-
ity.
1 Introduction
In the Laeken summit (2001), members of the EU-15 ¯xed eleven objectives
for pension systems with particular emphasis on three general targets: ad-
equacy, ¯nancial sustainability and modernization. Three of the eleven ob-
jectives were speci¯cally aimed at the adequacy of pension systems: poverty
among the elderly, living-standard smoothing after retirement and (intra- and
inter-generational) solidarity (EC 2003).
Hereafter, it seems reasonable to believe that policy proposals in this ¯eld
will be supported in the name of the three targets above, by which a deeper
analysis is de¯nitely opportune. Also, it might be of interest to understand if
and how recent sustainability-oriented pension reforms may have a®ected the
adequacy of pension systems.
In this study we focus on the de¯nition of indexes for each of the three ad-
equacy objectives. The basic methodology is mostly drawn from the existing
literature on poverty and inequality comparisons, by which indexes are ex-
pected to satisfy, at the very least, main statistical properties and fair norms.
In this context, peculiarities of the pension system have been opportunely
taken into account.
The paper is organized as follows. The basic concepts behind the three ob-
jectives for an adequate pension system are discussed in section 2. In section3, indexes are proposed for each of the adequacy objectives. 1 Section 4 con-
cludes.
2 Conceptual framework
Adequacy concerns the ability of the pension system to achieve its objectives,
which, indeed, are not uniquely de¯ned a priori. In the Laeken summit, three
objectives have been agreed in order to identify adequate pension systems: (1)
\to ensure that older people are not placed at risk of poverty and can enjoy a
decent standard of living", (2) \to enable people to maintain, to a reasonable
degree, their living standards after retirement", and (3) \to promote solidarity
within and between generations" (EC 2003).
In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is worth observing that adequacy or-
derings do not immediately imply social desirability ones. The latter involve
both adequacy and ¯nancial sustainability issues. In this sense, social desir-
ability judgements might be formulated in terms of adequacy within the sole
set of equally ¯nancially sustainable pension schemes. 2
An important observation about the nature of the three objectives is required
at the outset. Living-standard smoothing di®ers with respect to the others be-
cause of (i) the basic perspective and (ii) the logical foundation. First, living-
standard smoothing relies on the individual/longitudinal perspective, while
the other two objectives refer to an aggregate/cross section perspective. Sec-
ond, it traces back to the well-known life-cycle hypothesis, while poverty and
solidarity issues ¯nd their origins in the theory of distributive justice. In some
way, the opportunity for smoothing policies is mostly supported by the need
for e±ciency improvements within second-best economies, instead, redistri-
bution (within and between) generations aims at equity-improvements within
economies characterized by unfair/brute allocations of endowments/outcomes.
Poverty risk
This is probably the most straightforward objective for an adequate pension
system. The social security concept emerged in di±cult historical circum-
stances, when ¯ght against extreme poverty was a key preoccupation of the
social decision-maker. Nowadays, as then, because of the fall in productivity
1 Since most of the analytical results in this paper are common knowledge in the
literature on poverty, inequality and social welfare comparisons, indexes are not
presented in the standard axiom-theorem framework. In this sense, the main concern
is about implications of pension systems' peculiarities for standard poverty and
inequality indexes.
2 The lack of ¯nancial sustainability aspects automatically implies that adequacy
comparisons might be not very informative when comparing tax- and contribution-
sustained pension schemes.
2with aging, the main rationale behind mandatory pension schemes is still rep-
resented by the prevention of poverty among the elderly.
Living-standard smoothing after retirement
The opportunity for living-standard smoothing ¯nds its origins in the well-
known life-cycle hypothesis, by which it is highlighted that individuals usually
prefer stable to unstable consumption paths: they save during high-productivity
stages in order to dissave during low-productivity ones. Unfortunately, indi-
vidual smoothing targets might be hijacked because of incomplete markets as
well as incomplete information, and, as a result, e±ciency improvements in
second-best economies might be well attained by enabling more reasonable
degrees of smoothing. Apart of the origins, the Laeken summit refers to living
standards, ie. the quantity/quality of goods/services an individual may have
access to, 3 not consumption. Living-standards after retirement are inevitably
a®ected by the intertemporal allocation of consumption, but the two concepts
are not equivalent (Morduch 1995): perfect consumption smoothing does not
necessarily imply perfect living-standard smoothing, and vice versa.
Solidarity within and between generations
By virtue of objective (3), an adequate pension system should promote solidar-
ity within and between generations. However, it is worth drawing a separat-
ing line between intra-generational (within generations) and inter-generational
solidarity (between generations). Equity issues are involved in both cases, but
with di®erent implications. Inter-generational solidarity is aimed at the pre-
vention of large income-gaps among the active and the retired part of the
same population, by which, in the primordial state of the world, it allows
for partial/full insurance against demographic and ¯nancial risks (rates of
economic, wage and population growth, in°ation and ¯nancial returns). Intra-
generational solidarity, instead, focuses on the risk of large and unfair pension
income disparities among members of the same cohort, and it might be ap-
propriately referred to as progressivity. 4
3 This value is inevitably a®ected by subjective (needs) as well as social living
conditions.
4 On the one hand, it is usually observed that the main drawback of progressivity
consists of the e±ciency loss due to disincentives in the labor market. On the other
hand, within a primordial risk-averse scenario, progressivity may well be welfare
improving, since it acts as an insurance against random/systematic/brute income
disparities (Mirrlees 1974, Varian 1980, Fleurbaey 2001), \that is not available in
the market" (Diamond 2004).
33 Adequacy comparisons in a multi-objective scenario
3.1 Basic premises
In this paper, poverty, smoothing, progressivity and solidarity are investigated
through the use of selected indexes within a complete ordering approach. How-
ever, indexes are not the only feasible alternative. For the sake of robustness,
stochastic dominance conditions, as de¯ned under the unanimity requirement,
might be preferred. For instance, we may claim that society A is poorer than
society B if and only if any poverty-averse individual would label A as poorer
than B (Foster and Shorrocks 1988). On the one hand, indexes might be pre-
ferred since they allow for complete orderings, and, as a result, facilitate policy
decisions. On the other hand, indexes automatically entail a loss of robustness
since orderings are required to satisfy consistency, not unanimity, where an
index is said to be consistent if its orderings never contradict the ones obtained
under the corresponding dominance condition.
For our purposes, a separating line has to be drawn between structural and
e®ective indexes. The former is strictly concerned with the structure of tax or
pension schemes and it ignores the pre-tax income distribution. On the con-
trary, e®ective indexes measure the impact of the tax or pension scheme on
the pre-tax population. Here, the scheme matters since there are individuals
a®ected by it, which seems to suit better the analysis of poverty as well as
inequality issues.
Most of the aspects considered for adequacy purposes are well-known to be
sensitive to the timing approach. By virtue of the ex-ante approach, current
pension systems are assessed today with respect to the expected evolution of
micro and macro variables like working income, longevity, ¯nancial and eco-
nomic growth rates. Within the ex-post framework, instead, pension systems
are assessed once all relevant variables are revealed. These two approaches are
not necessarily equivalent. 5 In this study we refer to micro-simulated data, so
that, given the relevant probability distributions, fertility and mortality rates,
¯nancial and growth variables, individual pro¯les (eg. income, household size,
longevity) are identi¯ed under certainty (ex-post) conditions.
Since individuals are not expected to be homogenous in needs as well as in the
quality and quantity of goods/services they have access to, any aggregation of
5 For instance, it is usually observed that, ex-ante, not ex-post, the redistribution
induced by the positive correlation between working income and longevity would
be totally neglected (Creedy et al. 1993). However, as will be clearer later on, ex-
ante, it is still possible to capture the expected perverse/fair redistribution whenever
heterogenous longevity expectations are opportunely considered in the construction
of the actuarially equivalent (solidarity neutral) distribution of pension incomes.
We'll return this topic in section 4.
4incomes among heterogenous income units would be a non sense: it might well
be the case that equally endowed individuals enjoy di®erent living standards.
In order to tackle the heterogeneity in needs characterizing income units, we
refer to disposable equivalent incomes (living standards) as obtained through
standard multiplicative equivalizing transformations (Ebert and Moyes 2003).
Also, we assume that members of the same household equally share the same
living standard.
In order to capture the redistribution induced by pension systems we refer to
both actual and virtual pension incomes, where the latter is obtained under
the hypothesis of no redistribution at all. With this purpose in mind, two
di®erent approaches might be considered: (i) actuarial fairness (no-pension
system hypothesis), or, (ii) actuarial equivalence (null solidarity). By the for-
mer, it is hypothesized that individuals accumulate their savings in a risk-free
asset at the market return (Creedy et al. 1993, Disney 2004). By actuarial
equivalence, instead, it is hypothesized that individuals get (a) the market
return on savings accumulated in funded pension schemes, and (b) the sum of
labor force and productivity growth for savings accumulated in PAYG systems
(Samuelson 1958, Aaron 1966). The null solidarity hypothesis is more conve-
nient for our purposes, since it excludes a priori any sort of adequacy-relevant
redistribution (poverty, intra- and inter-generational). 6
We indicate by yt¡k;h := fy1;t¡k;h;:::;ynt¡k;h;t¡k;hg 2 <
nt¡k;h
+ the vector of net
disposable equivalent incomes in the working life (at the net value of volun-
tary pension-oriented savings) for active individuals at time t¡k belonging to
cohort h, by pt;h := fp1;t;h;:::;prt;h;t;hg 2 <
rt;h
+ the vector of disposable equiv-
alent pension incomes for retired individuals at time t of cohort h, and, by
p¤
t;h := fp¤
1;t;h;:::;p¤
rt;h;t;hg 2 <
rt;h
+ the vector of disposable equivalent virtual
pension incomes - as calculated under the hypothesis of actuarial equivalence
- for retired individuals at time t of cohort h. 7 Obviously, the size of these
vectors is allowed to vary over both time and cohort. From a longitudinal point
of view, we indicate by `i;h, ¹ yi;h and ¹ pi;h respectively lifetime income, average
working and average pension income received by the ith income unit of cohort
h. From a cross-section point of view, instead, we indicate by ¹(yt) and ¹(pt)
respectively the average working and pension income among living individuals
at time t. Henceforth, we refer to working and pension income respectively in
6 If each individual is allowed to participate in both funded (¸i) and unfunded
schemes (1¡¸i) at the corresponding rates of return (r,g), then, unless of particular
circumstances (¸i = ¸ 8 i) the comparison between actual and virtual income dis-
tributions as obtained under actuarial fairness would naturally entail some ¯ctitious
intra-generational redistribution, whose origins are indeed of the inter-generational
kind (Disney 2004).
7 The distribution of virtual pension incomes is constructed assuming no individual
behavioral response under the null solidarity hypothesis. In this sense, individual
needs and the quality/quantity of services individuals have access to are assumed
to be independent of the degree of solidarity (inter- and intra-generational).
5place of equivalent disposable income in the working and elder life.
3.2 Poverty
Poverty has been widely investigated in the existing literature, but some basic
notations are required for our purposes. First, we are not interested in the
level of poverty itself, but in poverty-relevant implications of pension systems.
In order to capture these aspects, we refer to a sort of Reynolds and Smolen-
sky (1977) index which is de¯ned as the di®erence between virtual and actual
poverty, ie. how much poverty would have been under the hypothesis of an ac-
tuarially equivalent pension scheme and how much poverty really is. Second, a
generally accepted approach to the de¯nition of the poverty line does not exist
yet, and hopefully won't. In this study, we neglect poverty line debates; we
assume that, for each period, there exists a generally agreed absolute poverty
line, zt, which is invariant with respect to income distributions. Third, indi-
vidual pension incomes as well as poverty lines are not necessarily constant
over time. Indeed, living standards after retirement might be a®ected by both
indexing factors as well as changes of individual needs over time. As a matter
of fact, it might well be the case that some retired income units fall below the
poverty line in some, not all periods.
In order to simplify the basic notations, let's suppose that members of the
same cohort receive the ¯rst pension income at time t+1 (results are inde-
pendent of this simpli¯cation). Then the ith pension income pro¯le is pi;h :=
fpi;t+1;h;pi;t+2;h:::;pi;t+ºi;hg 2 <
ºi
+ with pt+ºi indicating ith pension income in
last living period. Also, let's de¯ne by z := fzt+1;zt+2;:::;zt+ºig the vector of
poverty lines associated to each period, which applies to all members of the
same population. Under the assumption of additive separability, the multi-
dimensional nature of the problem can be tackled by virtue of a sequential
aggregation, by which the poverty index among the elderly of cohort h, Ih, is
de¯ned as the additively separable aggregation of individual poverty rates, Ii,
which, in turn, is a function of ith pension income pro¯le (Bourguignon and
6Chakravarty 2003), 8 ie.,
I
°
h =
1
rh
rh X
i=1
[Ii;h(pi;t+1;h;:::;pi;t+ºi;h)]
°
=
1
rh
rh X
i=1
·
®1max
Ã
1 ¡
pi;t+1;h
zt+1
;0
!µi
+ ::: + ®ºimax
Ã
1 ¡
pi;t+ºi;h
zt+ºi
;0
!µi¸ °
µi
(1)
where rh, ®i, µ and ° indicate respectively the number of individuals of cohort
h achieving retirement, the positive weights associated to each dimension (pe-
riod), the parametrization of the elasticity of substitution and the coe±cient
of poverty aversion. In particular, since poverty attributes consist of poverty
gaps in terms of living standards over di®erent periods, ®1 = ::: = ®ºi = 1
ºi 8 i
can be assumed without loss of generality. 9 Main properties of (1) are given
in the appendix (A).
As observed in Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003), the poverty index in (1)
is a multidimensional extension of the well-known Foster et al. (1984)'s poverty
index and it captures both the intensity and recurrence of poverty within a
multi-dimensional framework. In particular, it is worth observing that if ° = 0,
then (1) is a multi-dimensional headcount ratio, 10 while, if ° = 1, then (1) is a
poverty gap ratio as de¯ned under the CES aggregation of univariate poverty
gaps. Formally speaking, decision-maker's preferences are de¯ned such that
(i) the poverty index must be increasing with individual poverty rates (° > 0)
and (ii) the poverty index is decreasing for non re-ranking rich-to-poor trans-
fers among individual poverty rates (° > 1). 11
For µi = 1 8 i a linear aggregation of relative poverty gaps is imposed. As
special case, it is worth observing that, given ®1 = ::: = ®ºi = 1
ºi 8 i and
8 The main drawback of the sequential aggregation consists of the lack of con-
sistency with its immediate counterpart. The poverty index might be constructed
aggregating ¯rst individual incomes in each period, and then poverty indexes over
time. These two procedures are not expected to be ordinally equivalent each other.
However, within the ¯eld of additively separable (sub-group decomposable) poverty
measures, Bourguignon-Chakravarty's procedure might be easily supported in or-
der to avoid very restrictive separability assumptions on the intertemporal aggre-
gation function, eg. the counterpart discussed above would automatically imply
@I
@pi;t@pi;t+1 = 0.
9 Because of homogeneity of degree 0, actuarial transformations can be neglected.
In addition, because of the decision-maker's ex-post-based perspective, the discount
factor has been assumed to be 1.
10 In order to get this result, the summation should be considered with respect to the
sole ¯rst q individuals, ie. the income units whose attributes are below the poverty
line at least in one dimension (period).
11 In addition, for ° > 2 it must be the case that the same transfer among (non-null)
individual poverty rates is more a®ecting the lower is the poverty rate of the poorest
income unit, ie. the transfer sensitivity axiom (Foster et al. 1984).
7µi = 1 8 i, under some circumstances, (1) orders income distributions consis-
tently with poverty dominance conditions as de¯ned on the univariate distri-
bution of average and/or primary pension incomes (appendix B).
For µi > 1 8 i, individual poverty rates are a concave aggregation of poverty
gaps over time. In this context, a convenient assumption might be the follow-
ing, µi = max
½
zt
pi;t+1;h;:::;
zt+ºi
pi;t+ºi;h
¾
, by which individuals are assumed to be
heterogeneously averse to inter-temporal °uctuations of poverty gaps as well
as pension incomes. In this case, if an individual is extremely and maximally
poor at time t+d (dth dimension), then any reduction of the poverty gap at
some time t+j (jth dimension) is almost useless in order to alleviate from
poverty. 12
Once the poverty index has been de¯ned, the reduction of poverty among
the elderly induced by the redistributive nature of pension systems can be
measured sic et simpliciter as
P
°
h = I
°
h(p
¤;z) ¡ I
°
h(p;z) (2)
where p¤;p 2 <+ indicate respectively the vectors of virtual and actual pen-
sion incomes. In particular, it can be shown that P
°
h satis¯es the following
properties: (a) monotonicity, meaning that, if the pension system causes some
pension income below the poverty line to increase, then P
°
h increases, (b)
strong focus, ie. the index is neutral with respect to income changes above
the poverty line, (c) scale invariance (appendix), (d) replication invariance,
(e) P
°
h 2 [¡1;1] and (f) sub-group decomposability.
3.3 Living-standard smoothing after retirement
By virtue of the Laeken summit, pension systems should \enable people to
maintain, to a reasonable degree, their living standards after retirement". This
statement allows for several observations. First, the decision-maker is not di-
rectly concerned with the intertemporal allocation of consumption, but with
the more general allocation of living standards. As a result, the decision-maker
is not just concerned with the ability of individuals to smooth consumption,
but with the ability of pension schemes to allow for living-standard smooth-
ing. Second, the adequacy of pension system is a non-increasing function of
the gap between pre- and post-retirement living standards. Third, there is
no concern for the degree of smoothing during the working life. Fourth, the
pension system is expected to enable, not to impose, smoothing, by which
the focus shouldn't be restricted to the sole bene¯t formula and mandatory
12 As observed in Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003), the poverty index is in-
creasing with respect to correlation-increasing switches if ° > µ, and vice versa
(Atkinson and Bourguignon 1982, Duclos 2006).
8contributions. 13
In order to measure the living-standard gap at retirement, \living standards"
are de¯ned in terms of average disposable equivalent working incomes at the
net value of voluntary pension savings (¹ yi), where di®erent intervals of the
working life might be considered depending on basic assumptions. More com-
plicated is the identi¯cation of some reference living standard after retirement.
As for poverty, living standards associated to pension incomes are not expected
to be constant over time, meaning that, dependence on either average or pri-
mary insurance bene¯ts might be cause a relevant loss of information. More
generally, it might be said that the ith degree of smoothing concerns with the
vector of living-standard gaps between average working income and pension
incomes at di®erent periods, by which each individual degree of smoothing is
some function Á[j¹ y1;h¡p1;t;hj;j¹ y1;h¡p1;t+1;hj;:::] with Á0(¢) < 0. Notice that this
speci¯cation automatically implies that both under- and over-savings are non-
desirable attributes of a pension system. This is not irrelevant for measurement
purposes. In the existing literature, living-standard smoothing is usually mea-
sured through replacement ratios, ie. RRi =
¹ pi
¹ yi, where the numerator is often
replaced by the primary insurance bene¯t. Unfortunately, this index would
be seriously misleading when looking at the average degree of consumption
smoothing in the society: the average replacement ratio, RR = 1
n
P
i RRi,
would automatically entail compensation among < 1 and > 1 individual re-
placement ratios. As a matter of fact, it might be observed that the average
replacement ratio does not necessarily satisfy the basic monotonicity require-
ment, by which, at the very least, the degree of living-standard smoothing in a
society should be increasing with respect to any individual-based (horizontal)
gap-reducing income redistribution.
However, it might be convenient to retain the intuitive idea behind the replace-
ment ratio. With this purpose in mind, let's restrict the domain of possible
living-standard vectors such that pi;t+k;h · 2¹ yi;h 8 i;k. 14 Then, a general-
ized version of the ith replacement ratio at time t+k might be de¯ned as
RRi;t+k;h = 1 ¡
j¹ yi;h¡pi;t+k;hj
¹ yi;h . Following the same aggregation as for relative
poverty gaps, a complete ordering in terms of living-standard smoothing can
be de¯ned as the un-weighted aggregation of individual generalized replace-
13 For instance, one should be taking into account that information and education
can reasonably a®ect the degree of living-standard smoothing through an appropri-
ate demand for voluntary savings.
14 In other words, living standards after retirement never double living standards
in the working life. This restriction is not very strong since living standards
(not incomes) matter. Also, it is worth observing that truncation is a very com-
mon practice in empirical income studies. Alternatively, in line with the Gini's
reformulation in Sen (1973), relative living-standard gaps might be de¯ned as
(¹ yi;h ¡ pi;t+k;h)=(¹ yi;h + pi;t+k;h), by which the domain restriction would be not re-
quired any further.
9ment ratios, ie.,
C
´
h =
1
rh
rh X
i=1
2
4
ºi X
k=1
®k
Ã
1 ¡
j¹ yi;h ¡ pi;t+k;hj
¹ yi;h
!¯i
3
5
´
¯i
(3)
where i := 1;:::;rh refers to income units of cohort h at retirement, k := 1;:::;ºi
indicates the periods in which the ith income unit receives pension incomes,
¯i is the degree of substitutability among individual degrees of smoothing over
time and ´ > 0 is the degree of aversion to living-standard gaps at retirement
(or, degree of care for smoothing). As for the poverty index, ®1 = ::: = ®ºi =
1
ºi 8 i can be assumed without loss of generality. Notice that, in contrast with
(1), ¯i is just the parametrization of the degree of substitutability among de-
grees of smoothing, not attributes (pension incomes). For ¯ > 1, iso-smoothing
contours are convex to the origin in the space of degrees of smoothing and in-
dividuals are averse to intertemporal °uctuations of the degrees of smoothing.
However, for ¯ > 1 iso-smoothing contours in the space of pension incomes are
convex if ¹ yi;h > pi;t+k;h 8 k, but concave if ¹ yi;h < pi;t+k;h 8 k. In particular, for
¯ = 0 degrees of smoothing as well as pension incomes over time are perfect
substitutes and the iso-smoothing contour is a straight line.
If ´ = 0, then the degree of living-standard smoothing is always maximum
since null aversion to gaps is assumed. For 0 < ´ < 1, C
´
h is a concave ag-
gregation of individual degrees of smoothing, meaning that, the policy-maker
attaches a larger weight at the margin to individuals with a low degree of
smoothing. 15 For ´ = 1, the consumption smoothing index is de¯ned sic et
simpliciter as the average of individual degrees of smoothing.
The smoothing index in (3) satis¯es the following properties: (a) monotonicity
with respect to gap-reducing income redistribution at the individual level, (b)
scale invariance, (c) C
´
h 2 [0;1], with C
´
h = 1 if and only if perfect smoothing
occurs at retirement for all income units, (d) replication invariance, and (e)
sub-group decomposability, ie. the degree of living-standard smoothing in a
society is equivalent to the weighted (sub-group share) aggregation of living-
standard smoothing in each sub-group. Finally, under some circumstances, C
´
h
is equivalent to the average replacement ratio by construction. 16
In order to measure the ability of pension schemes to enable living-standard
smoothing, we may want to consider the gap between the actual degree of
smoothing in (3) and the virtual degree of smoothing which would have been
occurred in absence of mandatory saving plans. Unfortunately, the latter is
15 Low degree of smoothing does not imply either low or high living standards. In
this sense, value judgements may be not very ethically founded in this context.
16 From (3), it must be the case that, if ¯i = 1 8 i, then
C1
h =
(
1
rh
Prh
i=1
¹ pi;h
¹ yi;h if ¹ yi;h ¸ pi;t+k;h 8 k; i;
2 ¡ 1
rh
Prh
i=1
¹ pi;h
¹ yi;h if ¹ yi;h · pi;t+k;h 8 k; i.
10not straightforward at all. In this paper, we stick to (3), which is equivalent
to assuming that, in absence of mandatory saving plans, populations would
achieve the same degree of (virtual) smoothing.
3.4 Intra- and inter-generational solidarity
3.4.1 Progressivity
Progressivity concerns with the equality improvement/loss induced by the
pension system. This should be not confused with actuarial unfairness since
the former is independent of identities, not the latter. In particular, in this
section we refer exclusively to e®ective progressivity measures, which have
been widely investigated in the exiting literature on ¯scal progressivity. Espe-
cially the Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) (RS) and the Kakwani (1977) (K)
index have been widely used in progressivity comparisons. 17 RS is de¯ned
sic et simpliciter as the di®erence between pre- and post-tax Gini indexes. K,
instead, consists of the di®erence between the concentration index, as calcu-
lated on the distribution of tax liabilities, and the Gini index, as calculated on
the pre-tax income distribution. The latter measures the disproportionality of
taxes with respect to the allocation of pre-tax income. 18 For our purposes,
the pre-tax income distribution consists of the virtual distribution of pension
incomes as obtained under actuarial equivalence, while the post-tax distribu-
tion is the actual distribution of pension incomes in the society. 19
17 In the ¯eld of pension systems, the existing literature has been mostly focusing on
the e®ective progression index (Nelissen 1995, Coronado et al. 2000, Oshio 2002),
that is informationally (not ordinally) equivalent to the RS.
18 For the implications of di®erent pre-tax income distributions in progressivity com-
parisons see Lambert and Pfahler (1992).
19 In this paper we refer to pension incomes not lifetime ones, even if the existing
literature is mostly oriented to the latter. Actually, lifetime-based progressivity is
not independent of the distribution of working incomes and, since progressivity is
regarded as adequacy improving, it automatically implies that pension systems aim
at working income disparities compensation, ie. the -1 correlation between working
and pension incomes would be generally preferred. Di®erences between these two
views are intuitive whenever a perfectly egalitarian distribution of virtual pension
incomes is assumed. In this scenario, progressivity improvements would be feasible
within the lifetime, not pension view. In general, the two views are partially con-
ciliable each other whenever pension schemes are ordering-preserving with respect
to the three relevant income vectors (y;p¤;p): if, for each couple, the richest in-
come unit in the working life is the one saving more (in the working life) as well
as bene¯tting more (after retirement), then any progressivity improving policy in
the pension view must be lifetime progressivity improving, not vice versa. Summing
up, in this paper we opt for the pension view in order to avoid any interference of
the working income distribution, whose relevance in terms of adequacy has been
11Let p¤
h;ph 2 <r
+ be the virtual and actual pension income vectors of cohort
h. The pension system is revenue neutral (¯nancially sustainable) whenever
P
i(p¤
i;h ¡ pi;h) = 0. As observed in Creedy et al. (1993), revenue neutrality is
crucial in order to avoid any interference between ¯nancial sustainability of the
pension system and intra-generational redistribution. 20 Technically speaking,
given the distribution of virtual pension income, we may want the progres-
sivity index (P) to be independent of total tax liabilities (or subsidies), ie.,
given p¤
h;ph 2 <
rh
+ , if p0
i;h = (1 ¡ ¸)p¤
i;h + ¸pi;h 8 i, then P(ph;p¤
h) = P(p0
h;p¤
h)
8 ¸ > 0. In ¯scal progressivity, K (not RS) is well-known to satisfy this prop-
erty. However, when dealing with pension systems, it should be taken into
account that (i) taxes might be negative for some individuals and (ii) the av-
erage tax rate might be negative. The former is not su±cient to jeopardize
either the opportunity for Gini-based inequality orderings or the relationship
between RS and K. However, since the concentration curve is expected to be
negative for the poorest income units, the concentration index is not necessar-
ily bounded on [0,1] any longer (Chen et al. 1982, Berrebi and Silber 1985).
On the contrary, some observations are required for the latter. If the average
tax rate is negative (g < 0), then the pension system is progressive when-
ever the concentration curve of (negative) tax liabilities lies no where below
the Lorenz curve of virtual (pre-tax) pension incomes, ie. if subsidies (nega-
tive tax liabilities) are more equally distributed than virtual pension incomes.
Formally, given
P
i(p¤
i;h ¡ pi;h) < 0, the pension system is progressive if and
only if [¹j(p¤
h) ¡ ¹j(ph)]=[¹(p¤
h) ¡ ¹(ph)] ¸ ¹(p¤
h)=¹j(p¤
h) 8 j := 1;:::;n. Even
more, if the largest shares of subsidies are associated to poor income units,
ie. [¹j(p¤
h)¡¹j(ph)]=[¹(p¤
h)¡¹(ph)] ¸ 1 8 j, then the concentration curve lies
above the bisectrix.
Claim 3.1
Given (i) (p¤
i;h ¡ pi;h) 2 <rh with
Prh
i=1(p¤
i;h ¡ pi;h) 6= 0 and (ii) ph ordering-
preserving with respect to p¤
h, the Kakwani index is de¯ned as follows
K =
8
<
:
C(p¤
h ¡ ph) ¡ G(p¤
h) if
P
i(p¤
i;h ¡ pi;h) > 0 =) RS =
g
1¡gK;
¡C(p¤
h ¡ ph) + G(p¤
h) if
P
i(p¤
i;h ¡ pi;h) < 0 =) RS = a
1¡aK
(4)
where a = [
P
i(pi;h¡p¤
i;h)]=
P
i pi;h is the average subsidy rate as calculated with
respect to the total amount of actual pension incomes. (Proof in appendix C).
Then, (4) is independent of total tax liabilities or subsidies. However, for our
purposes, the same property should be satis¯ed within a multi-period frame-
work. Here, it might be convenient to assume that the progressivity index is
already discussed in the previous section.
20 In Creedy et al. (1993), the revenue neutrality condition implies equivalence be-
tween the actuarial value of total contributions and the bene¯ts paid by/to a gen-
eration.
12independent of the total amount of tax liabilities or subsidies received over the
whole pension income pro¯le independently of the intertemporal allocation.
Claim 3.2
Given P = KfC[Á(p¤
t+1;h ¡ pt+1;h;:::;p¤
t+ºi;h ¡ pt+ºi;h)];G[Á(p¤
t+1;h;:::;p¤
t+ºi;h)]g
with Á(¢) additively separable, 21 if (i)
Prh
i=1
Pºi
k=1(p¤
i;t+k;h ¡ pi;t+k;h) 6= 0 and
(ii) 1
ºi
Pºi
k=1 pi;t+k;h is ordering-preserving with respect to 1
ºi
Pºi
k=1 p¤
i;t+k;h, then
Ph = K
(
C
" º X
k=1
®k(p
¤
t+k;h ¡ pt+k;h)
#
;G
" º X
k=1
®kp
¤
t+k;h
#)
(5)
where t+ºi is the last period with i receiving pension bene¯ts and K is de¯ned
as in (4), is independent of total tax liability or subsidies. 22 (Appendix D).
As for poverty and smoothing, ®1;:::;®ºi = 1=ºi 8 i may be assumed without
loss of generality. 23 In particular, P satis¯es the following properties: (a)
monotonicity, ie. given an ordering preserving pension system at each period,
if society A is obtained from society B by virtue of some additional subsidies
or taxes redistributed in favor of poor income units in some period, then it
must be the case that PA ¸ PB, (b) scale invariance with respect to actual
and virtual pension incomes ([¸p¤;¸p]), (c) multi-period independence of total
tax liabilities (appendix D), (d) symmetry, (e) replication invariance and (f)
sub-group decomposability in Dagum (1997)'s sense. 24
3.4.2 Inter-generational solidarity
Pension incomes are inevitably a®ected by demographic and economic growth
factors. In this sense di®erent generations face a gamble, by which, ex-post,
there may be \losers" or \winners" without any immediate individual respon-
sibility. By virtue of the Laeken summit, it is observed that adequate pension
systems should prevent large gaps among the active and retired part of the
21 Once again, a sequential aggregation has been preferred, by which the progres-
sivity index is de¯ned aggregating ¯rst individual incomes and taxes over time,
next individual positions across the population. Given Á(¢) additively separable,
the converse would automatically imply @P
@pi;t;h@pi;t+1;h = 0 8 i, that is a very strong
assumption.
22 In order to simplify notations, individuals are assumed retire in the same period.
23 Alternatively, the market rate of return might be used in order to account for
actuarial values. In this case, it has to be observed that the two `if ' conditions in
(4) apply in actuarial terms.
24 Dagum's k-group decomposition involves three components: (i) the net contri-
bution of the Gini inequality between sub-populations, (ii) the contribution of the
Gini inequality within sub-populations and (iii) the contributions of the intensity
of transvariation between sub-populations.
13population at each period, that is, gap-reducing inter-generational redistribu-
tion is adequacy improving.
The peculiarity of inter-generational solidarity with respect to former objec-
tives consists of the two basic agents to be considered for measuring purposes,
respectively the active and the retired part of the population within an over-
lapping generations perspective. We indicate by ¹(yt) and ¹(pt;h), respectively
the average income of the working population at time t and the average in-
come of retirees of cohort h at time t. 25
As for the previous section, the measurement of solidarity aspects opportunely
relies on the comparison between what has really occurred and what would
have occurred in the absence of inter-generational redistribution. In line with
our observations above, we refer to the virtual income distribution as ob-
tained under the hypothesis of actuarial equivalence, which implies null inter-
generational transfers whatever the pension system.
In the existing literature on the measurement of solidarity, two di®erent ap-
proaches have been considered. On the one hand, (generational) replacement
ratios (GRR) - the ratio between the average pension income of the retirees
and the average working income of the active generation at time t - are usually
exploited in order to capture the degree of inter-generational solidarity. Unfor-
tunately, this measure captures the sole gap among active and retired income
units, not the inter-generational redistribution occurring between them. On
the other hand, governments intertemporal budget constraints have been ex-
ploited in order to measure how much future generations must pay in net taxes
(generational accounts) in order to tackle the current spending commitment of
the government (Auerbach et al. 1991). This approach focuses on the amount
of transfer received or paid by each generation, but it wouldn't capture the
gap variation among active and retired income units of the same population.
Then, in order to capture the amount of inter-generational solidarity, the
two approaches above might be merged in such a way to focus on how pen-
sion schemes a®ect the income-gap among active and retired generations, ie.
(j¹(yt)¡¹(p¤
t;h)j¡j¹(yt)¡¹(pt;h)j). This di®erence is positive in case of (fair)
gap reducing pension schemes, and vice versa. In particular, it can be shown
that this indicator is orderly equivalent to the absolute re-formulation of the
Gini's index as calculated on the distribution of average income among the
active and retired part of the population. 26
Without loss of generality, we can restrict the domain of possible income dis-
tributions such that (j¹(yt) ¡ ¹(p¤
t;h)j ¡ j¹(yt) ¡ ¹(pt;h)j) · ¹(yt). Under this
assumption, inter-generational solidarity of cohort h can be de¯ned as the
25 Reference to average incomes allows to avoid any interference with intra-
generational aspects as well as any dependency of the size of the two sub-populations
(even if the latter enters the analysis through the PAYG's rate of return).
26 From Sen (1973)'s re-formulation of the Gini, it must be the case that G¤
t =
j¹(yt)¡¹(p¤
t;h)j
¹(yt)+¹(p¤
t;h) and Gt =
j¹(yt)¡¹(pt;h)j
¹(yt)+¹(pt;h) , which indicate respectively virtual and actual
income disparities among the active and retired part of the population.
14un-weighted linear aggregation of the degrees of solidarity at each period, 27
ie.
Sh =
1
º
º X
k=1
j¹(yt+k) ¡ ¹(p¤
t+k;h)j
¹(yt+k)
¡
1
º
º X
k=1
j¹(yt+k) ¡ ¹(pt+k;h)j
¹(yt+k)
(6)
where t+º is the last period with at least one survived retiree of cohort h. Sh
is positive in the presence of gap-reducing redistribution on average, and vice
versa. For ¹(yt+k) ¸ ¹(p¤
t+k;h);¹(pt+k;h) 8 k, (6) is just the di®erence between
average generational replacement ratios, ie. Sh = GRRh ¡ GRR
¤
h.
Formally, solidarity orderings obtained through (6) must be consistent with
the more robust partial ordering criterion, by which, if the area between the
virtual and actual Lorenz curves of society A in each period is larger than B's
one for any p% share of poorest income units, then A has at least as much
solidarity as B. In addition, it can be shown that (6) is (a) scale invariant, (b)
symmetric, (c) replication invariant and that (d) Sh 2 [¡1;+1].
4 Concluding remarks
In the recent years political debates on pension systems have allowed for the
de¯nition of the basic objectives of pension system. Among all, pension sys-
tems are required to be adequate, that is, to prevent from poverty among the
elderly, to allow for consumption smoothing at (and after) retirement, and to
redistribute within and across cohorts in order to account for unfair income
disparities due to non-responsible choices. As a matter of fact, measurement
issues becomes crucial in order to assess current pension systems and political
proposals.
In this paper we have proposed indexes for the measurement of the adequacy of
pension systems for each of the three perspectives agreed in the Laeken Sum-
mit. We show that the the prevention of poverty due to the pension system
can be measured as the gap of FGT poverty indexes obtained, respectively,
from the virtual and the actual income distribution (the former is obtained
under the hypothesis of no pension system). In order to measure the degree
to which pension systems allow for smoothing at (and after) retirement, we
propose a modi¯ed version of the replacement rate which is obtained from
the aggregation, for each income unit, of income gaps at each period after
retirement. In order to measure the solidarity of pension systems two di®er-
ent perspectives have been considered. First, the Kakwani index, opportunely
27 The un-weighted linear aggregation has been preferred since the main focus in
the case of inter-generational solidarity is on the transfer of resources, not its im-
plications. However, if the e®ective progression index (Musgrave and Thin 1948) -
de¯ned in [0;+1] - is preferred with respect to the Reynolds-Smolensky's - nega-
tive in case of unfair (gap-increasing) inter-generational redistribution - the more
general CES aggregation might be considered as well.
15modi¯ed in order to account for the possibility of negative tax-rates, is shown
to match the measurement of intra-generational solidarity induced by pension
systems. Second, a Gini-based index of inter-generational redistribution due
to pension systems has been proposed. The latter accounts for both relevant
aspects of inter-generational redistribution: (a) the gap among the active and
retired part of the population, that is usually measured through generational
replacement rates and (b) the amount of transfers received or paid by each
generation, that is usually measured through generational accounts.
16APPENDIX
A
Axiom A.1 Strong Focus
Let's consider two populations A and B of r income units each in m periods,
whose pension incomes at time t+k for the ith income unit are indicated re-
spectively by pA
i;t+k and pB
i;t+k. If (i) pA
i;t+k ¸ zt+k, (ii) pB
i;t+k = pA
i;t+k + ¢ with
¢ > 0 and (iii) pB
j;t+s = pA
j;t+s 8 j 6= i, pB
i;t+s = pA
j;t+s 8 s 6= k and 8 i, then it
must be the case that P(A) = P(B).
Axiom A.2 Scale invariance
Let's consider two populations A and B of r income units each over m peri-
ods, whose pension incomes at time t+k for the ith income unit are indicated
respectively by pA
i;t+k and pB
i;t+k. If zB
t+k = ¸zA
t+k and pB
i;t+k = ¸pA
i;t+k 8 i; k with
¸ > 0 , then P(A) = P(B).
Axiom A.3 Monotonicity
Let's consider two populations A and B of r income units each in m periods,
whose pension incomes at time t+k for the ith income unit are indicated re-
spectively by pA
i;t+k and pB
i;t+k. If (i) pB
i;t+k = pA
i;t+k+¢ with ¢ > 0, pA
i;t+k < zt+k,
and (ii) pB
j;t+s = pA
j;t+s 8 j 6= i, pB
i;t+s = pA
j;t+s 8 s 6= k and 8 i, then it must be
the case that P(A) ¸ P(B).
Axiom A.4 Multi-dimensional principle of transfer
Let's A be the r £ m matrix A indicating the allocation of pension incomes
among r individuals in m periods. If B = H ¢ A where H is a bi-stochastic
matrix whose elements hij 6= 1 8 i;j, then P(A) ¸ P(B).
Axiom A.5 Replication invariance
Given an allocation A of pension incomes among a population of r income
units over m periods, if population B is the k-fold replication of population A,
then P(A) = P(B).
Axiom A.6 Sub-group decomposability
Let A,...,Z be the ni £ m matrices obtained as a partition into non-empty
subgroups from the n£m matrix X indicating the allocation of pension incomes
among n income units over m periods such that
P
i ni = n, then P(X) =
nA
n P(A) + ::: + nZ
n P(Z).
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Claim B.1
Given two societies A and B such that zt+k = z 8 k (zA = zB) and pi;t+k;h <
z 8 k or pi;t+k;h > z 8 k for each individual, if (i) multi-dimensional poverty is
de¯ned as some additively separable aggregation of the linear and un-weighted
aggregation of individual poverty gaps over time and (ii) any non re-ranking
rich-to-poor transfer is poverty reducing, then the two following statements are
equivalent:
- A is at least as poor as B for all poverty averse and transfer sensitive indi-
viduals;
- the cumulated di®erence between A's and B's distribution function of aver-
age pension incomes is non negative for all ¹ ph < z.
Proof B.1 Given
P = Ã
½
'
·µ
1 ¡
p1;t+1;h
z
¶
;:::;
µ
1 ¡
p1;t+ºi;h
z
¶¸
;:::
:::;'
·µ
1 ¡
prh;t+1;h
z
¶
;:::;
µ
1 ¡
prh;t+ºi;h
z
¶¸¾
such that Ã(¢) : <
rh
+ ! <+ is additively separable and '(¢) : <
ºi
+ ! <+ linear
and un-weighted, then
P =
Z z
0
Á
µ
1 ¡
¹ ph
z
¶
f(¹ ph)d¹ ph
where f(¹ ph) is the density function of individual average incomes. Given Á(0) =
0 and Á0(0) = 0. In addition, from Foster et al. (1984), if the social decision-
maker is averse to poverty and any rich-to-poor transfer is poverty enhancing,
then Á0(¢) > 0 and Á00(¢) ¸ 0. Given,
P(A) ¡ P(B) =
Z z
0
Á
µ
1 ¡
¹ ph
z
¶
[f
A(¹ ph) ¡ f
B(¹ ph)]d¹ ph (B.1)
and, integrating by parts two times,
P(A) ¡ P(B) =
1
z2
Z z
0
Á
00
µ
1 ¡
¹ ph
z
¶
S
z(¹ ph)d¹ ph (B.2)
where F(¢) =
R
f(¢)d(¢) and Sz(¹ ph) =
R ¹ ph=z
0 [F A(x) ¡ F B(x)]dx. By contradic-
tion, it can be shown that P(A)¡P(B) ¸ 0 if and only if Sz(¹ ph) ¸ 0 8 x < z.
Claim B.2 28
From (1), if (i) all individuals of cohort h retire at the same period (ii) µi =
28 This result might be particularly interesting when measuring poverty from micro-
simulated data.
181 8 i, (iii) ®k = 1
ºi 8 k and (iv) zt+k = »kzt+k¡1 8 k, pi;t+k;h = »kpi;t+k¡1;h 8 i
and 8 k with »k > 0 8 k, then
I
°
h =
1
rh
rh X
i=1
max
Ã
1 ¡
pi;t+1;h
zt+1
;0
!°
Proof B.2 Straightforward from (1).
C
Proof C.1 (Claim 3.1) K is de¯ned as twice the area (A) between the Lorenz
curves of tax liabilities and virtual pension incomes. Since the ¯rst line in
(4) is well-known, let's focus on the second line only. Indicating the Lorenz
curve and tax liabilities by L(¢) and t respectively, it must be the case that
2A = 2
R 1
0 L(th)dth ¡2
R 1
0 L(p¤
h)dp¤
h = 2¡2
R 1
0 L(¡th)d(¡th)¡2
R 1
0 L(p¤
h)dp¤
h =
G(¡th)+G(p¤
h) = ¡G(th)+G(p¤
h) = ¡C(th)+G(p¤
h), where the last step holds
since ph is ordering-preserving with respect to p¤
h.
D
Axiom D.1 (Multi-period independence of total tax liabilities)
Given p¤
t+k;h;pt+k;h 2 <
rh
+ with k := 1;:::;ºi, if p0
t+k;h is constructed such that
Pºi
k=1 p0
i;t+k;h = (1 ¡ ¸)
Pºi
k=1 p¤
i;t+k;h + ¸
Pºi
k=1 pi;t+k;h 8 i, then P(p¤
h;ph) =
P(p¤
h;p0
h).
Proof D.1 (Claim 3.2) Since C and G are h.d.0, P satis¯es axiom 3.2 if
Á(¢) is homogenous. Additive separability over time implies Á(p¤
t+1;h¡pt+1;h;:::;p¤
t+ºi;h¡
pt+ºi;h) = Ã(p¤
t+1;h ¡ pt+1;h) + ::: + Ã(p¤
t+ºi;h ¡ pt+ºi;h), while
Pºi
k=1 p0
i;t+k;h =
(1¡¸)
Pºi
k=1 p¤
i;t+k;h +¸
Pºi
k=1 pi;t+k;h 8 i implies both (i) independence of total
generational tax liabilities and (ii) independence of intertemporal allocation of
tax liabilities over time. Then, Ã(¢) must be linear and multiplicative.
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